The writing on the wall was first seen last year, while the nuclear power reactor in Younggwang, Younggwang 3, was being inspected. During the maintenance process, damage in control rod guide tubes was detected, which could have caused dire consequences, including an explosion, if radioactive steam leaked through the crack in the tube. Younggwang 3 had to shut down for inspection and a major overhaul in November 2012. It was certainly an urgent matter directly linked to public safety, but the incident was somehow not immediately known to public. Even when it became known that both the operator of the nuclear power plant Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) and the regulatory authority the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSCC) tried to hush up the affair, no one really suspected it to be just the very tip of the iceberg.
Soon after, another nuclear reactor, Younggwang 4, was diagnosed with problems in the control rod guide tube. The Wolsung 1 reactor, of which the design life came to an end on November 20th, 2012, was also embroiled in controversy as KHNP came up with an operation life extension plan. Environmental and citizen's groups have been protesting against such extension of operation life out of safety concerns.
In the meanwhile, one of the main issues of this infamous nuclear power scandal was brought up: fake certificates. All parts supplied for use in the reactors require quality and safety certificates from one of 12 international organizations designated by Seoul. Nevertheless, it turned out that 587 parts in 34 categories used for nuclear reactors including Uljin 3, 4, and Younggwang 3, 4, 5, and 6 were supplied based on forged qualification documents. Further inspection after the parade of shutdowns found 694 more parts in 12 categories with fake warranties used in Younggwang 5 and 6 to stave off their reactivation. In May, more nuclear reactors were closed over forged documents in Gori, near the southern port of Busan.
At proper capacity, South Korea's nuclear reactors supply more than 35 percent of national electricity needs. Since 10 of 23 reactors are currently offline for various reasons, 7,700,000 kilowatts of electricity - about 37% of national nuclear power capacity - cannot be produced, prompting government warnings of serious power shortages.
According to the parliamentary audit report last year, four companies barred from bidding due to involvement in irregularities between 2008 and 2012 had won presidential commendations or been recognized as “outstanding nuclear power businesses for shared growth and cooperation.” Saehan TEP, one of the testing organizations implicated in the forgery of test results for control cables, has earned an award for being an “outstanding business” from the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology in 2012. KHNP has roughly one thousand companies making three million nuclear power plant parts, but now it is uncertain how safe they truly are. Even NSCC acknowledged that similar scandals could emerge in the future.
Critics peg a “back-scratching” culture as the root of the problem, which has been endemic since the atomic energy division was established in 1956 in the technology education bureau of what was then the Ministry of Education. “There has never been any accountability or punishment whenever a problem has occurred,” said Jang Jeong-wook, an economics professor at Japan’s Matsuyama University. “The logic that governs South Korean nuclear power plant safety is less about safety than economics.”
Up until the NSSC was founded in October 2011, national nuclear power safety and oversight was in charge of agencies that also carried out nuclear power promotion, such as the MEST. Laws on nuclear power operated through one system, the Atomic Energy Act, for around fifty years. It took until July 2011 for them to be separated into the Nuclear Power Promotion Act, Nuclear Safety Act, NSSC Act, and other legislation. The previous system had been noted as a problem by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Even after the NSSC took over regulatory duties in 2011, reliable supervision is scarce still. The chairman of the NSSC Lee Eun-cheol and former chairman Kang Chang-soon were both members of the Korean Nuclear Society. Many executives at Doosan Heavy Industries and Samsung C&T, which were involved in power plant constructions, also belong to the society.
The nuclear community in South Korea is a cramped world - and a powerful one at that. The longstanding trend of former officials at KHNP being hired by partner businesses has been accused by many as a major factor in corruption. According to the data on employment for former employees at KHNP, 81 former executives and Level 1A, 1B, and 2 officials were employed at 61 private businesses, public enterprises, and research institutions between 2003 and 2012. 73 of the 81 were ranked at least Level 1, which means they could have been power plant directors or office or section chiefs at the corporation’s headquarters. “Stakeholders are employed in the government and regulatory organizations. We could be seeing a lot more layers to the nuclear power scandal onion going ahead,” said Jang Jeong-wook.
With the expertise involved, symbiosis between regulatory organizations and nuclear power promotion companies seems inevitable. Since KHNP provides part of the nuclear energy R&D and safety monitoring budget, the NSSC’s independence also cannot be guaranteed.
The close ties between companies and regulatory officials, and the exclusive ecosystem in the nuclear power business, have earned them the notorious nickname of “nuclear power mafia.” Since the eruption of the scandal, a number of officials and workers involved have been submitted to disciplinary measures. After President Park Geun-Hye demanded action over what she called "unpardonable" corruption in the nuclear power sector, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy said in a statement that KHNP president Kim Kyun-Seop was dismissed from his post. It added that An Seung-Kyoo, CEO of Korea Electronic Power Corporation Engineering and Construction (KEPCO E&C), which is responsible for nuclear power plant design and technology, would also be fired at a board meeting.
The nation has been deeply disheartened by this whole nuclear power fiasco, but still, the mafia bosses are hidden in the dark. People who have been caught are just strings, not even near the “puller”. Despite increasing public concern, the government has vowed to move on with its nuclear power program and plans to build an additional 16 reactors by 2030.
South Korea is the second country in East Asia to host a World Energy Congress. The World Energy Congress is an international conference by the World Energy Council consisting of over 3,000 companies from 92 countries. A wide range of influential figures will appear, and it is an unprecedented opportunity to network with top global players, explore business opportunities, secure investment, and access new markets.
Daegu was chosen to be the host city as Korea’s green growth capital, representing the country’s “sustainable energy development initiatives,” which appears to have faded after the nuclear power scandal. What the energy authorities have to do in order to be a proud host of the World Energy Congress is a major detox of the system. The time has come for the nuclear power mafia to come out of their inner circles and learn to live like innocent citizens.